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This paper explores the role of financial factors in the 2008-9 collapse of U.S. imports 
and exports. Using highly disaggregated international trade data, we examine whether the 
cross-sectoral variation in how much imports or exports fell during this episode can be 
explained by financial variables. To do this, we employ a wide variety of possible 
indicators, such as standard measures of trade credit and external finance dependence, 
proxies for shipping lags at the sector level, and shares of intra-firm trade in each sector. 
Overall, there is very little evidence that financial factors played a role in the collapse of 
U.S. trade.  
 
JEL Classifications: F41, F42 
 




The contraction in trade that occurred during the 2008-9 recession was global in scale and 
remarkably deep. Over the 2008:2 to 2009:2 period, real U.S. goods imports fell by 21.4 
percent and exports 18.9 percent. The drop in trade flows in the U.S. is even more 
dramatic when one takes into account the fact that both import and export prices 
simultaneously fell relative to domestic prices, which normally would have resulted in an 
expansion of trade flows. 
 
A number of recent papers have suggested that credit constraints were a significant 
contributing factor to the global decline in trade (see, e.g., Auboin 2009, IMF 2009, Chor 
and Manova, 2010). To be sure, financial intermediaries were at the epicenter of the 
global crisis and it is clear that credit conditions facing firms and households tightened in 
the fall of 2008. These constraints could be particularly important for firms engaged in 
international trade, as they must extend credit to their foreign counterparties prior to the 
shipment of goods. If these lines of credit are suspended, importing firms will cancel their 
orders for foreign goods, and foreign firms will reduce production.  
 
As reasonable as this hypothesis sounds, it is a difficult empirical challenge to isolate the 
impact of tightening credit constraints on the collapse in trade flows. First, it is hard to 
tell whether a drop in credit extended to firms is due to a supply-side constraint (banks 
won’t extend credit) or a drop in demand (demand falls so firms import fewer goods and 
require less credit). Second, while we can observe a firm’s dependence on credit, it is 
difficult if not impossible to obtain precise data on the cost of credit associated with the 
international shipment of goods. Third, given the importance of multinational firms in 
international trade, it is an open question whether multinationals require credit to acquire 
goods from their own affiliates or long-term trade partners, and to the extent they do 
require credit, how such financial flows will appear in the firm’s balance sheet. 
 
This paper explores the role of financial factors in the collapse of U.S. imports and 
exports. Using data disaggregated at the 6-digit NAICS level (about 450 distinct sectors), 
we examine whether the cross-sectoral variation in how much imports or exports fell 
during this episode can be explained by financial variables. To do this, we employ a wide 
variety of possible indicators, such as standard measures of trade credit and external 
finance dependence, proxies for shipping lags at the sector level, and shares of intra-firm 
trade in each sector. In each case, our hypothesis is that if financial factors did play a role 
in the fall of U.S. trade, then one should expect international trade flows to fall by more 
in sectors with certain characteristics, a strategy reminiscent of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998).  
 
Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows. Overall, there is at best weak 
evidence for the role of financial factors in the collapse in U.S. trade. Imports or exports 
did not fall systematically more in (i) sectors that extend or receive more trade credit; (ii) 
sectors that have a higher dependence on external finance or lower asset tangibility; (iii) 
sectors in which U.S. trade is dominated by countries experiencing greater financial   3 
distress; (iv) sectors with lower intra-firm trade. All of these are reasonable sectoral 
characteristics to examine for evidence of financial factors in trade, as we detail in each 
case below.  
 
For imports into the U.S., we do find some evidence that shipping lags mattered. Sectors 
in which a higher share of imports is shipped by ocean or land experienced larger 
reductions in trade. In addition, sectors with longer ocean-shipping delays also 
experienced significantly larger falls in imports. This is indirect evidence for the role of 
trade finance during the recent trade collapse. Trade finance instruments, such as letters 
of credit, are typically used to cover goods that are in transit. Thus, trade finance is likely 
to matter more for sectors in which goods are in transit longer – either because they are 
mostly shipped by land or sea; or because they tend to be shipped greater distances. Thus, 
our finding that these sectors experienced larger reductions in U.S. imports can be seen as 
supportive of the role of financial factors in the trade collapse. 
 
All in all, however, the bottom line of our exercise is that in the sample of highly 
disaggregated U.S. imports and exports, evidence of financial factors has proven hard to 
find. 
 
2. U.S. trade flows and measures of trade finance 
 
We analyze monthly nominal data for U.S. imports and exports vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world at the NAICS 6-digit level of disaggregation from the USITC. This is the most 
finely disaggregated NAICS trade data available at the monthly frequency, yielding about 
450 distinct sectors. Our empirical methodology follows Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar 
(2010, henceforth LLT), which can also serve as the source for detailed data 
documentation. In each sector, we compute the year-on-year percentage drop in quarterly 
trade flows, from 2008:2 to 2009:2. This period corresponds quite closely to the peak to 
trough of the aggregate U.S. imports and exports.  
 
Our working hypothesis is that if financial factors did matter for the fall in U.S. trade 
during this period, then the financial contraction should have affected certain sectors 
more than others. Thus, we estimate the following specification: 
  
𝗾𝗾𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝗼𝗼 + 𝗽𝗽𝗽𝗽𝗽𝗽𝗽𝗽𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +  𝗿𝗿𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖, 
 
where i indexes sectors, 𝗾𝗾𝑖𝑖
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is the percentage change in the trade flow, which will be 
alternatively exports or imports, and CHARi is a sectoral characteristic meant to proxy for 
the role of financial factors. All of the specifications include a vector of controls Xi. The 
baseline controls are (i) the share of the sector in the overall U.S. imports and exports, a 
proxy for size; (ii) elasticity of substitution among the varieties in the sector, sourced 
from Broda and Weinstein (2006); and (iii) labor intensity of the sector, computed based 
on the U.S. Input-Output matrix. In LLT, we used a similar framework to test the relative 
importance of vertical production linkages, trade credit, and compositional 
effects/durables demand for trade flows. We found that two additional sectoral 
characteristics were robustly correlated with declines in trade: the extent of downstream   4 
linkages and whether the sector was durable. Based on these findings, we include our 
preferred measure of downstream linkages (average usage of a sector as an intermediate 
in other sectors) and a dummy for durability as controls in all specifications.  
 
This paper focuses on the hypothesis that financial variables played a role, and tests 
whether a variety of proxies for financing costs can account for the cross-sectoral 
variation in trade flows. The sectoral characteristics we consider are as follows.  
 
• Trade Credit. We evaluate the hypothesis that because of the credit crunch, firms 
were no longer willing to extend trade credit to their suppliers. Under this view, 
international trade would fall, for instance, because U.S. buyers could no longer 
extend trade credit to foreign firms from which they normally purchase goods. To 
test this hypothesis, we build two measures of trade credit intensity. The first is 
accounts payable/cost of goods sold. This variable records the amount of credit 
that is extended to the firm by suppliers, relative to the cost of production. The 
second is accounts receivable/sales. This is a measure of how much the firm 
extends credit to its customers. These are the two most standard indices in the 
trade credit literature (see, e.g., Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende 2007), and are 
constructed using firm-level data from Compustat.
1
 
 If importing and exporting 
firms are dependent on trade credit, these two measures of credit dependence 
should appear with a negative coefficient (sectors with more trade credit 
dependence should experience a larger reduction in trade flows). 
• External finance dependence. The second set of measures is inspired by the large 
literature on the role of financial constraints in sectoral production and trade. 
Following the seminal contribution of Rajan and Zingales (1998), we compute 
external finance dependence as the share of investment not financed out of current 
cash flow. This measure is based on the assumption that in certain industries, 
investments by firms cannot be financed with internal cash flows, and these are 
the industries that are especially dependent on external finance. If financially 
dependent industries were in systematically greater distress during this crisis, the 
coefficient on this variable should be negative (greater dependence leads to larger 
falls in trade). 
 
A related measure is the level of tangible assets (plant, property, and equipment), 
as a share of total assets by sector. Firms with greater tangible assets should have 
better collateral and therefore an easier time obtaining credit. This variable should 
have a positive coefficient in our regressions (more pledgeable assets means it is 
easier to raise external finance, and thus a credit crunch will have less of an 
                                                        
1 We obtain data on all firms in Compustat from 2000 to 2008, compute these ratios for each firm in each 
quarter, and then take the median value for each firm across all the quarters for which data are available. 
We then take the median of this value across firms in each industry. We take medians to reduce the impact 
of outliers, which tend to be large in firm-level data. Taking means instead leaves the results unchanged. 
Since coverage is uneven across sectors, we ensure that we have at least 10 firms over which we calculate 
trade credit intensity. This implies that sometimes the level of variation is at the 5-, 4-, and even 3-digit 
level, though the trade data are at the 6-digit NAICS level of disaggregation. See LLT for more details. 
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impact on production or cross-border trade). As with measures of trade credit, 
external finance dependence indicators were built using standard definitions and 
data from Compustat. 
 
• Partner country credit conditions. The next hypothesis we test is that trade 
should fall disproportionately more with countries that experienced greater 
financial distress. This approach is inspired by the work of Chor and Manova 
(2010), who find a link between credit conditions in the trading partner and the 
volume of bilateral trade. To capture this effect, we follow LLT in creating a 
trade-weighted credit contraction (TWCC) measure for imports and exports:  
 
𝑇𝑇𝑊𝑊𝗽𝗽𝗽𝗽𝑖𝑖





where c indexes countries, the superscript trade refers to either imports or exports, 
Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝗽𝗽𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 is the change in the interbank lending rate over the period of the 
crisis in country c, and aic is the pre-crisis share of total U.S. trade in sector i 
captured by country c. For imports, aic is thus the share of total U.S. imports 
coming from country c in sector i, while for exports, aic is the share of total U.S. 
exports in sector i going to country c.  
 
In case of imports, the value of TWCC will be high if in sector i, a greater share of 
U.S. pre-crisis imports comes from countries that experienced a more severe 
credit crunch. Therefore, if the credit crunch hypothesis is correct, the coefficient 
on this variable will be negative (tighter partner-country credit conditions lead to 




• Shipping lags and trade finance. Auboin (2009) and Amiti and Weinstein (2009) 
emphasize the role of trade finance instruments in international trade. These 
instruments, such as letters of credit, are used by firms to cover costs and 
guarantee payment while goods are in transit. We are not aware of any sector-
level measures of trade finance used by U.S. firms engaged in international trade. 
However, if the needs for trade finance are positively related to the time it takes a 
good to reach its destination, one might expect trade finance costs to be increasing 
with distance and delivery lags. For ocean transit, shipping times can be as long as 
several weeks (Hummels and Schaur, 2010), during which the exporting firm 
would typically be waiting for payment.  
 
If these considerations matter, we should expect trade to fall more in sectors with 
longer shipping lags. In order to test for this possibility, we use bilateral trade data 
disaggregated by mode of shipping to compute several indicators of delays.
3
                                                        
2 We are grateful to Davin Chor and Kalina Manova for sharing the interbank rate data used in their paper.  
 The 
first is simply the average distance travelled by a dollar’s worth of imports or 
3 We use 2007 data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and made available by Peter Schott on his website: 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm.   6 
exports in each sector. The second is the share of imports and exports that 
travelled by air, ship, and over land. The hypothesis is that in sectors dominated 
by air shipping, trade finance would matter much less, since air shipping time is 
almost never greater than one or two days (Hummels, 2007). However, in sectors 
dominated by other forms of shipping, delays are substantially longer, and thus a 
disruption in trade finance potentially more damaging.  
 
Finally, we use data on average ocean shipping times from each country to the 












In this expression, c indexes countries, the superscript trade can refer to either 
imports or exports, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐,𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  is the share of country c’s ocean trade in total U.S. 
ocean trade in sector i, 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖,𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑜𝑜
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡  is the share of U.S. trade in sector i that is shipped 
by ocean, and ShipDaysc is the ocean shipping time from country c to the United 
States. We do not have shipping time measures for shipments by air and other 
means. In calculating our measure, we assume that shipment by air or other means 
(which usually means truck or pipeline) takes 2 days.  
 
Thus, TIMEi is the average shipping time, in days, for a dollar’s worth of imports 
or exports in sector i. If firms must raise finance to cover the period goods are in 
transit, one would expect a negative coefficient on the variables reflecting 
shipping delays (larger delays mean a greater role for trade finance, implying a 




• Intra-firm trade. Finally, we hypothesize that trade finance used for insuring 
exporters against non-payment for the shipment will matter less if trade is intra-
firm. Thus, a contraction in trade finance will have less of an impact, if any, on 
the more than one-third of U.S. trade that is intra-firm. To check for this 
possibility, we regress the fall in trade in a sector on the share of intra-firm trade 
in total trade in the sector. This variable is computed by combining multinational 
affiliate sales data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis with standard 
international trade data, and averaging over the period 2002-2006. Sectors with a 
greater share of intra-firm trade should experience smaller reductions in trade – a 
positive coefficient. 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
across the sectors) for the variables used in the analysis. The top panel shows statistics for 
the two dependent variables, the percentage change in imports and exports over the 
2008:2 to 2009:2 period. The mean sectoral decline is 25.3 percent for imports and 20.9 
                                                        
4 We are very grateful to David Hummels and Georg Schaur for computing these measures for us using 
their ocean shipping time data.    7 
percent for exports. There is considerable heterogeneity across sectors – some sectors 
even saw an expansion of trade, while others experienced a large contraction. Thus, there 
is a great deal of cross-sectoral variation that could potentially be exploited. 
 
3. Estimation results  
 
We now turn to the results of the regression analysis. Table 2 presents the results when 
the dependent variable is U.S. imports by sector and Table 3 the results when the 
dependent variable is U.S. exports. Throughout, we report the standardized beta 
coefficients, obtained by first renormalizing each variable to have mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 1. Thus, all the regression coefficients correspond to the number of standard 
deviations change in the left-hand side variable that would be due to a one-standard 
deviation change in the right-hand side variable. This also implies that the magnitudes of 
the coefficients are comparable across variables that may have very different scales when 
not normalized.  
 
The controls for sector size in trade and labor intensity come in strongly significant 
across the board. In addition, the main two variables found to be significant in our earlier 
study – durability and vertical production linkages – remain strongly significant, with all 
p-values less than 1% in case of U.S. imports.  
 
The coefficients on the financial variables are less consistent. Columns (1) and (2) of 
each table report the results for the trade credit variables. For imports, the coefficients are 
not significant, and the point estimates are close to zero. For exports, accounts payable is 
not significant with a near-zero point estimate, while the accounts receivable variable is 
significant at the 10% level, but with the “wrong” sign: exports in sectors that extend 
trade credit more intensively fell by less. 
 
Columns (3) and (4) of Tables 2 and 3 report the results for the measures of external 
finance dependence. While for both directions of trade flows, the Rajan-Zingales measure 
of external dependence is insignificant with a near-zero beta coefficient, asset tangibility 
is significant, but once again with the “wrong” sign: sectors with a greater share of 
tangible assets should have a relatively easier time getting credit during a crunch; we find 
that those sectors also had larger falls in both imports and exports. 
 
Column (5) reports the results for the trade-weighted credit contraction in the partner 
countries. Once again, while the coefficient is essentially zero for U.S. imports, for 
exports it is significant at 10% with the “wrong” sign: exports from the U.S. fell by less 
in sectors dominated by trading partners with greater credit contractions. 
 
Columns (6), (7), and (8) report the results of using shipping lags measures. For U.S. 
exports, these do not seem to matter. For imports there is some evidence for the role of 
shipping lags. While the simple average distance shipped is not significant (column 6), 
the mode of transportation is. Sectors with higher shares of imports shipped by ocean and 
other means (usually truck and pipeline) experienced larger falls than sectors with higher 
shares of air shipping (column 7). Furthermore, sectors with longer shipping times had   8 
larger falls in imports (column 8). The magnitudes of the beta coefficients are also 
economically significant: a one standard deviation change in share shipped by ocean is 
associated with a 0.148 standard deviations greater fall in imports. Similarly, a one 
standard deviation change in shipping time leads imports to fall by 0.123 standard 
deviations. 
 
One difficulty in interpreting the shipment coefficients is that the mode of shipping could 
be an endogenous variable. For instance, Hummels and Schaur (2010) find that firms 
choose the shipping mode optimally in response to demand volatility. A second problem 
is that the mode of shipping is likely to be correlated with the type of good (e.g. 
automobiles account for a substantial fraction of the decline in trade, and are never 
shipped by air). While other industry characteristics that we control for explicitly may 
sweep out some of this variation, there could be others that are missing from our analysis.  
 
Finally, column (9) reports the results of regressing imports and exports on the share of 
intra-firm trade in the sector. While the coefficient has the “right” sign, it is very close to 




It is widely recognized that the current global downturn was triggered by a large-scale 
financial crisis. At the same time, the world experienced a collapse in international trade 
of a magnitude unseen since World War II. Putting the two together, it is a reasonable 
hypothesis that financial factors contributed to the collapse in trade. However, hard 
evidence for this has proven elusive. In this paper, we test a battery of hypotheses for 
how financial factors could have affected U.S. imports and exports at the sector level. 
Overall, we find very little evidence that financial factors contributed to the trade 
collapse. This is in sharp contrast to the other measures that were found to matter a great 
deal in earlier studies: vertical production linkages and the role of durables. 
 
We conclude by highlighting some boundaries of our empirical analysis. First, even 
though we find hardly any effect of financial variables on overall U.S. import and export 
volumes in each sector, it could be that financial variables were partly responsible for 
collapses in bilateral trade from individual countries in particular sectors. This is 
consistent with the results of Chor and Manova (2010), who find that countries 
experiencing greater credit contractions reduced their exports to the U.S. especially in 
financially dependent sectors. Our results do point out that when aggregating across 
partner countries up to sector level, the effect disappears.  
 
In light of historical experience, this is not surprising. LLT find that relative to the level 
of economic activity, the fall in U.S. trade during the 2001 recession was almost as large 
as in 2008-9. However, the 2001 recession was not accompanied by a contraction in 
credit, suggesting that other mechanisms are probably responsible for falls in cross-
border trade during economic downturns. 
 
Second, though the U.S. is widely seen as the epicenter of the financial crisis, its financial   9 
system is nonetheless one of the deepest and most resilient in the world. Thus, it could be 
that even if we find no effect of financial factors for U.S. trade, these factors are much 
more important in other countries with weaker financial systems. Indeed, Iacovone and 
Zavacka (2009) do find that in a wide sample of countries, past banking crises did affect 
international trade flows.  
 
Third, even if we were to find a significant impact of financial characteristics on 
international trade volumes, such a result would not necessarily be evidence of financial 
factors in international trade specifically, since production may have fallen by just as 
much in each sector. Thus, a conclusive test of the role of financial variables in the trade 
collapse would have to find that financial factors were responsible for changes in trade 
over and above the change in output. This is a critique that applies also to the other 
existing studies of finance and trade, though it is less of a problem for our negative 
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